Weaver Fintech is a genuinely interesting business — 5.1 million customers across lending, payments, and insurance, with a connected ecosystem that creates real network effects. Fintech fee income jumped 43% and cash generated from operations rose 43% to R320 million. The revenue story is intact. The problem is that all that growth isn't converting to the bottom line. EPS of 256.5c is down from 285.5c a year ago. Trading profit grew just 2% on 10% revenue growth — that's negative operating leverage. Management cited 'lending credit performance with payment processing issues, macroeconomic pressure and a deliberate increase in credit provisions.' Translation: their loan book is getting worse, and they're booking provisions for it.
The board changes add uncertainty: Pierre Joubert moves from lead independent to chairman, Shirley Maltz to executive deputy chair. Succession is orderly but it's a lot of moving chairs mid-cycle. At PE 12.9x and PB 1.3x, the market hasn't punished Weaver yet — it's still pricing the growth story, not the profit problem. The R1.1bn in cash and facilities provides runway, but if credit losses keep rising, that cash will get consumed. Rating: BEARISH. Top-line growth is seductive, but earnings direction is what matters. This one needs to prove its lending model works through a cycle first.
The operational update is a masterclass in what makes Shoprite the best-run retailer in Africa. Sales of R270.8 billion — adding R18.1 billion year-on-year — with the core Supermarkets RSA (84.5% of Group) growing 7.1%. Checkers and Checkers Hyper at +10% is genuinely elite retailing. Sixty60, the on-demand delivery platform, hit R25.5 billion in sales, up 34.5%. That's a R25.5 billion business growing at 35% inside a retailer that most people think is boring. Think about that.
Internal selling price inflation of 0.8% versus Stats SA CPI Food of 3.9% means Shoprite is deliberately absorbing margin to protect its customer base. That's a long-game strategy and it's working — like-for-like sales grew 2.0%, implying real volume growth. Adjacent businesses (+57.4%) and new formats (Petshop Science, Uniq, Checkers Outdoor) are tiny but growing fast — call options on future retail categories. The HEPS guidance of 1,498-1,567c puts the stock on a forward PE of ~20x. Not cheap, but quality rarely is. The full year results on 1 September should confirm the trajectory. Rating: BULLISH. Shoprite is a compounding machine dressed up as a supermarket.
This trading statement is a brutal reality check. Prior year HEPS of 100.66 cents per share — which made Sebata look like a mini-conglomerate giant trading on a PE of 1.4x — was entirely propped up by non-recurring items that have now vanished. The normalized earnings base is 4.66-5.96 cents of HEPS, putting the stock on a forward PE of roughly 25x. That's no longer a screaming bargain; it's a fairly-priced micro-cap. The company remains profitable, which is more than many General Segment listings can say, and the PB of 0.37x suggests some asset backing. But the days of triple-digit earnings were an illusion.
The Altman Z-Score of 0.95 is worrying — technically in distress territory. Insiders own 83.7%, meaning the free float is roughly R25 million. That's a rounding error. The full results are due 14 August, which should shed light on what the actual operating segments earn. Until then, this is a show-me story. Rating: NEUTRAL. The prior year's earnings were a house of cards. The real Sebata is a much smaller, much less exciting business. Wait for the full results.
Resilient is the best-run retail REIT in South Africa, and these interim numbers show why. Like-for-like NPI growth of 6.0% is outstanding in an economy where retail sales grew just 2.9%. Vacancies at 1.9% — including planned vacancies for asset management initiatives — is world-class. Lease renewals concluded 2.5% higher than expiring rentals; new leases 7.1% higher. Escalations of 5.2% on renewals and new leases. The pricing power is real.
The offshore portfolio continues to perform: France NPI +6.6% despite political uncertainty, Spain retail sales +8.5%, and the Lighthouse dividend grew 11.2% in rand terms. The solar strategy (94.4 MWp installed capacity, supplying 43.2% of electricity needs) is a genuine moat — lower costs and energy security in a country where Eskom's cost-reflective pricing transition is just beginning. At PE 6.0x and PB 1.03x with a 6.7% trailing dividend yield, the market is pricing Resilient as if retail property has no future. The data disagrees. Rating: BULLISH. Resilient is boringly excellent. Buy the discount to NAV while it lasts.
Powerfleet — the Nasdaq-listed IoT and fleet management company with a secondary JSE listing — just showed its CFO the door. David Wilson was terminated effective 10 August, replaced by Paul Lalljie who was appointed President and CFO on 11 August. The speed is notable: no transition period, no 'mutual decision,' no 'pursuing other opportunities.' Just gone. The separation agreement suggests a clean break — Wilson gets COBRA coverage and a $37k/month consulting arrangement for 90 days. There's no suggestion of misconduct. But sudden CFO departures at a R65 stock raise eyebrows.
Lalljie's CV is a mixed bag. He spent nearly a decade as CFO of Neustar — a successful data analytics company — before jumping to 2U as CFO in 2019 and later CEO. 2U filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in July 2024. That's not a great reference for a new CFO. On the other hand, he was there through a brutal period for edtech and the bankruptcy was pre-packaged. He currently sits on the board of a Bitcoin company. The compensation package — $475k base, up to 85% bonus, 225k RSUs vesting over 3 years, 225k PSUs tied to stock price through 2029 — is aggressive. This is either a turnaround CFO hire or a board that's overpaying for a rebuild. Rating: NEUTRAL. A sudden CFO change always warrants caution. Watch for more management churn.
The numbers are staggering: 6E production up 5% to 3.56 million ounces, revenue per ounce surging 51% to R38,116, EBITDA hitting ~R43.6 billion, and free cash flow of R22 billion — and that's after a working capital drag from Zimplats receivables. The R8.1 billion impairment reversal at Impala Rustenburg (904c per share, post-tax) reflects higher prevailing rand PGM pricing. The balance sheet has never looked better. Debt-to-equity of 0.03x means they could buy back a quarter of the company if they wanted.
Unit costs rose 8% to R24,249/oz — not great, but more than absorbed by the revenue surge. The weighted share count dipped slightly thanks to buybacks. The trailing PE of 23x is meaningless — based on last year's R0.7bn earnings. The forward PE on the midpoint of the HEPS range (~2,540c) is roughly 8.4x. That's cheap for a diversified PGM miner with 3.56 million ounces of production. The full results on 3 September will reveal the dividend — the market is expecting a monster. Rating: BULLISH. Implats is printing money again. The question isn't whether it's cheap — it's how long the PGM cycle runs.
The headline EPS range of 85.9-93.4c versus last year's 219.8c looks like a catastrophe. It isn't. Last year's H1 included R902.8 million in once-off net profits from foreign currency translation reserves released on two transactions: acquiring the remaining 35% of the Matola terminal and exiting the marine fuel trading JV. Strip those out and the comparable earnings were ~R592 million — roughly the same as this year's R568-618 million.
Headline earnings per share of 85-92.5c versus 88.7c tells the real story: the underlying logistics and port operations are stable. Grindrod's core business — the Matola dry bulk terminal in Mozambique, the Maputo port operations, and the coastal shipping and clearing/forwarding — is a steady, hard-to-replicate infrastructure franchise. At PE 7.2x and PB 1.5x with 21.8% ROE, the market is pricing Grindrod like it's broken. It's not. The 11.4% sell-off is an opportunity for investors who read past the headline. The full results on 25 August will hopefully clarify the story. Rating: NEUTRAL. Headline numbers are scary but misleading. The underlying business is fine. Overreaction creates opportunity.
Cilo Cybin is a reverse takeover story. The company acquired Cilo Cybin Pharmaceutical in September 2025, settling in shares. Under IFRS, this is a reverse acquisition — the private company (CC Pharmaceutical) is deemed the acquirer, and the listed shell the acquiree. Because the listed shell didn't meet the definition of a 'business,' the excess consideration of R217.5 million was expensed as an IFRS 2 share-based payment. Result: a massive one-off charge that flipped EPS from a restated 9.49c profit to a 0.85c loss. That's not an operational problem — it's an accounting artefact of obtaining a JSE listing via a reverse takeover. But it's a red flag for governance quality.
The underlying pharmaceutical business might be viable — we simply don't know, because the SENS contains almost no operational disclosure. Stock hasn't traded since 31 July. The market cap is R288m on a PB of 2.88x with -273% ROE. The annual results are due 28 August. Those will be the first real look at what Cilo Cybin actually earns. Until then, this is a black box wrapped in IFRS complexity. Rating: BEARISH. Reverse acquisitions are messy, and the opacity here is a warning. Wait for the 28 August results before forming any view on the actual business.